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Ilargeting M2: The Issue of
Monetary Control
I
ADEALLY, AN INTERMEDIATE monetary
policy target should be both reliably associated
with the goals of monetary policy and readily
controlled.1 In the 1970s and early 1980s, Ml
was the Federal Reserve’s principal intermediate
monetary aggregate target because of its close
and stable relationship with nominal GDP. The
principal issue then was how well Ml could be
controlled. As an outgrowth of the controversy
over MI control, Congress passed the Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (MCA) and the Federal
Reserve replaced lagged reserve accounting
(LRA) with contemporaneous reserve accounting
(CRA). A principal objective of both the Act and
the return to CRA was to enhance Ml control.~
The breakdown of the relationship between
Ml and nominal GDP in the 1980s, however,
caused the Federal Reserve to shift its emphasis
away from Ml. In 1986, the Fed dropped Ml
from its list of intermediate policy targets and
M2 became the Fed’s principal monetary aggre-
gate. As with Ml, the decision to focus on MZ
was made on the basis of the long-run stability
of its relationship with nominal GDP.3 The issue
of M2’s controllability, however, has received
scant attention.
While the Federal Open Market Committee
currently sets target growth rate ranges for M2,
it is not the only aggregate that the Committee
targets. Moreover, its growth is hut one of many
factors that the Committee considers informulat-
ing and implementing monetary policy. Neverthe-
less, M2 does receive considerable attention both
in the Committee’s deliberations and in the press.
Consequently, this article analyzes the issue of
M2 control.
Under the existing system of reserve require-
ments, the Fed can successfully target and control
M2 only by implicifly targeting and controlling Ml.
At times, M2 control may require relatively large
open market operations. Other things the same,
such large operations are potentially destabilizing
for financial markets. Moreover, if Ml or total
reserves grow very rapidly while M2 grows slowly,
the market may have difficulty in interpreting the
thrust of monetary policy or the Fed’s intentions.
To mitigate these problems requires some
changes in the existing structure of reserve
requirements that, evidence suggests, would
enhance significantly the Fed’s ability to control
M2. These changes should have a minimal effect
1For modern survey of this literature, see Friedman (1990).
2The MCA extended Federal Reserve requirements to all
depository institutions, removed differential reserve
requirements by type of bank (Reserve City or Country)
and removed reserve requirements from a large category of
non-transaction deposits, not included in Ml.
3The empirical basis for focusing on M2 is established by
Hallman, Porter and Small (1991).24
on the operation of the reserve market and
can be accomplished without extending reserve
requirements to non-depository institutions or
increasing the so-called “reserve tax” on
depository institutions.
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Issues in monetary control are often framed
in terms of target variables, targets and instru-
ments. For purposes of this analysis the target
variable is taken to be M2, and the target is
taken to be a specific level or growth rate for
it.~The instrument is the tool the policymakers
use to guide the target variable to the target.
The degree of monetary control is defined by
the strength of the relationship between the
target variable and the policy instrument: the
stronger this relationship, the more precise the
control. Two possibilities exist. First, there could
be a direct relationship between the instrument
and the target variable, in which changes in the
instrument directly affect the target variable.
Second, there could be an indirect link between
the instrument and the target variable. In this
case, changes in the instrument affect the target
variable by affecting other variables, for example,
the interest rate.
Monetary control is more precise the smaller
the role of factors other than the policy instru-
ment in determining the target variable. Indeed,
control is best when there are no such “leak-
ages.” If the relationship between the target
variable and instrument is indirect, precise
control tends to be more difficult; factors other
than the policy instrument affect not only the
target variable, but also the relationship between
the instrument and the target variable. Such leak-
ages exist when the relationships between the in-
strument and the other variables or between the
other variables and the target variable are neither
strong nor precise. In any event, more and larger
leakages imply less control.
Furthermore, when control is indirect, the
relationship between the policy instrument and
the target may be unreliable and may change
from time to time, in response to such things as
financialinnovation and regulatory change. Hence,
the ability to control monetary aggregates through
such indirect channels may vary in ways that are
both difficult to explain and impossible topredict.~
Implementing a monetam’y control procedure is
complicated by other factors, such as the avail-
ability of information, the time horizon over
which the policymaker wishes to affect control,
possible “feedback” effects between other varia-
bles and the instrument and the ability to
predict factors that affect the aggregate that
cannot be controlled either directly or indirectly.
Since the purpose of this paper is simply to
point out the fundamental issues in controlling
M2, the question of how best to implement
a practical control procedure for M2 is not
considered.
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M2 consists of Ml plus an array of savings-
type deposits that are called the non-Mi
components of ME (NM1M2).°The Fed’s ability
to control ME depends on its ability to control
both Ml and NMIM2. If there were a direct
link between both of these ME components and
both could be controlled equally well, there
would be no difference between the Fed’s
ability to control Ml and its ability to control
ME. But this is not the case.
Historically, the Fed has established direct
control over the non-currency components of
the monetary aggregates through a system of
4Currently, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) sets
long-run target ranges for the growth rate of M2 from the
fourth quarter of one year to the fourth quarter of the next.
These growth rate ranges imply target ranges for the levels
of the variables over the planning period. The FOMC also
sets short-run growth rate ranges for M2 for the period
between meetings, that is, the ‘intermeeting period.” The
growth rate ranges, in turn, imply targets for the level of M2.
Hence, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
targets for the growth rate and targets for the level of M2.
5For example, the uncharacteristically slow growth recently of
the non-Ml components of M2 was unanticipated and is,
as yet, not understood. See Bullard (1992) and Carlson
(1992) for a discussion of this issue.
tmThe non-Mi components of M2 consist of savings deposits
(including money market deposit accounts), small denomi-
nation time deposits, general purpose broker/dealer money
market mutual funds, overnight RPs issued by all commer-
cial banks and overnight Eurodollars issued to U.S. residents
by foreign branches of U.S. banks. See Hafer (1980) for a
more detailed discussion of each component of M2 except
money market deposit accounts.25
reserve requirements.~In 1959, NM1ME con-
sisted primarily of time and savings deposits,
most of which were subject to the Federal
Reserve’s reserve requirements. The MCA,
however, eliminated reserve requirements on a
broad class of NMtME and the remainder were
eliminated in Deceniber 1990. Consequently,
currently there is no direct relationship
between the Fed’s actions and NM1ME. In
contrast, the MCA enhanced significantly the
relationship between the Fed’s instrument and
MI.8 Essentially, ME now consists of one
component, Ml, which the Fed can influence
directly, and another component, NMIME, over
which the Fed has no direct influence.
A detailed model of ME control is presented in
the appendix to this article; three conclusions
emerge from it. First, the Fed’s ability to control
ME is better the stronger the direct relationship
between its policy instrument and Ml and the
stronger the indirect effects of policy actions on
NM1ME. Second, because there is a strong
direct link between policy actions and Ml, other
things the same, ME control is better the larger
the proportion of Ml in ME. Finally, ME control
will be better the larger the indirect effects of
policy actions on NM1ME and, in particular, the
larger such effects are relative to the total
effect of policy actions on Ml.
To see why this last point applies, suppose
policy actions have no effect on NM1ME, either
diiect or indirect. In this case, ME can be
controlled only by manipulating Ml to com-
pletely offsett undesired movements in NM1ME.
Since NMIME is large relative to Ml, the re-
quired manipulation of Ml could be quite large.
If the indirect effect of policy actions on
NM1ME were large and positive, that is, if an
open market purchase results in an increase in
NMIME, the required manipulation of Ml
would be much smaller. If, however, the
indirect effects of policy actions on NMIME
were negative, so that an open market purchase
results in a decrease in NMIME, open market
operations would have to be pursued even
more aggressively. In othem’ words, the required
change in Ml would have to be larger to offset
the decline in NMIME.°
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The empit-ical analysis of the basic issues
raised above begins with a simple analysis of
the behavior of ME relative to that of Ml.
Figure 1 shows the share of Ml in ME during
the period of the official published series on the
monetary aggregates, January 1959 to March
1992. The proportion of Ml in ME declined
through the late 1970s, decreasing from nearly
50 percent in 1959 to about ES percent in 1977.
Since then, the ratio has changed relatively little
on average but has been somewhat variable.
Moreover, the proportion of ME growth
accounted for by NM1ME growth increased
significantly between 1959 and 1977. This is
illustrated in figure E, which shows the growth
rates of ME and NMIME since 1959. Before the
late l970s, the growth rate of NM1ME was
consistently higher than the growth rate of ME.
Since then, however, the growth rates of ME
and NMIME have been very similar.
7Some analysts point out that depository institutions would
maintain vault cash to service deposit inflows and outflows
from such deposits so that the money supply could be con-
trolled even in the absence of official reserve requirements.
In effect, such institutions would be maintaining reserves
equal to some fraction of these deposit balances, so effec-
tively they would be imposing reserve requirement on them-
selves. Indeed, currently a significant number of depository
institutions hold vault cash in excess of their reserve re-
quirement. While it is no doubt true that depository institu-
tions would hold cash for some purposes, there is no
guarantee nor evidence that this “implicit reserve ratio”
would be stable or systematically related to the level of
deposits. Under the present system of reserve requirements,
depository institutions attempt to economize on their hold-
ings of excess reserves. This is what makes reserve require-
ments an effective tool of monetary control.
tThe MCA required other changes that enhanced control
over Ml. Prior to the MCA, Federal Reserve reserve
requirements applied only to member banks. Hence, some
components of both Ml and NMIM2 were not directly linked
to the ~cy~’~ policy actions and, therefore, were not
under the Fed’s direct control. This constituted a potential
source of leakage of monetary control for both Ml and M2.
In addition, the reserve requirements on different deposits
were different, hence, the relationship between the policy in-
strument and a particular monetary aggregate would change
with shifts in the public’s preference for certain types of
deposits or financial innovations. See Garfinkel and Thorn-
ton (1989, 1991a).
°lnthe extreme and very unlikely case in which the negative
indirect effects of policy actions on NM1M2 were larger than
the sum of the positive direct and indirect effects of policy
actions on Ml, the process would be dynamically unstable.
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Estimates of the Effect of Policy Actions on Various Monetary
Aggregates, Monthly Data, March 1984 - March 1992
AM1 AM2 ~NM1M2 ATCD
Consfant 1863 IO.342 8469 0.619
(7.85) (12 38) (10.41) (276)
ATR 8.293’ 8 690 0.397 8.250’
(19.37) (577~ (0271 f20.37J
D.W 1 784 0727 0.612 1 853
Ad1 R~ 802 265 000 .820
‘indicates stat.st~cals!qn ‘icance at the 5 percoril level.
policy actions on Ml. This conclusion is rein-
forced by the fact that the adjusted 11-square
for the regression of the ATCI) on ATR is nearly
identical to that of the AMI regression, and the
fact that the coefficients on ATR are nearly
identical in tile two equations. Consequently, all
of the effect of ATR on AM1 comes through the
direct relationship between I’ll and TCD that
results from the Federal Reserve’s systemn of
reserve requirements.”
The results for ANM1ME show that the
indirect effect of policy actions on this compo-
nent of ME are nil.’” The adjusted R-square is
zero and the coefticient on ATR, which captures
both the direct and indirect effects of policy
actions, is statistically insignificant. The lack of
an effect on NM1ME is reflected in the coefficient
of ATR in the ME equation. This coefficient too
is not statistically different from 8.33, suggesting
that the marginal effect of policy actions on ME
comes solely through their effect on Ml.
It could be argued that the indirect effects of
policy actions on ME, say, through interest
rates, take time to work so that the potential
for indirect control of ME is not adequately
reflected in the monthly data. This issue is
investigated first by using lower frequency
(quarterly) data and second by including a six-
month distrihuted lag of ATE. The results using
quam’terly data, presented in table E, are similar
“This coefficient measures both the direct and indirect
effects of policy actions on Ml. See the appendix for
details. Because the total effect is not significantly different
from the direct effect, the indirect effect must be insignifi-
cantly differentfrom zero. See Garfinkel and Thornton (1991 a)
for an analysisof the relationship between currency and TCD.
“The lack of any significant serial correlation in the residuals
of the estimated equation suggests that the remaining
error is simply “control error” and seasonals.
“Note that the OW. statistic indicates significant first-order
serial correlation in all but the equation involving TCD. This
is to be expected because, in these cases, a simple regres-
sion of the changes in these variables on the change in to-
tal reserves does not adequately reflect the process
generating these variables. See the appendix to
Garfinkel and Thornton (1991 a) for an illustration of this
point using Ml. This merely confirms the fact that the
behavior of NM1M2 and, hence, M2 is not adequately
explained by Fed policy actions. The presence of positive,
first-order serial correlation does tend to bias the estimates
of the standard errors downward. Hence, the reported
t-stastistics may overstate the statistical significance of the
change in total reserves in these equations.29
Table 2
Estimates of the Effect of Policy Actions on Various Monetary
Aggregates, Quarterly Data, 1984.2 - 1992.1
AMI AMZ ANMIM2 ATCD
Constant 4 790 32270* 27.481 0.988
(7.21) (848) (699) (162)
&TR 9 683 8.353 1 330 9 657
(18 27) (2 75) (0 42) (19 85)
D.W. 1394 lOSS 0917 1684
Adj fl2 917 .162 000 930
*indi~tes statistical significance at the 5 percent levet
Table 3
Long-Run Effects of Policy Actions on Various Monetary
Aggregates, Monthly Data, March 1984 - March 1992
AMI AM2 ANM1M2 ATCD
Constant 1.471* 11352 9881 0170
(527) (10 95) (tO07) (066)
/3 7976* 10720* 2752 7.874
(1623) (587) (159) (1735)
0 9~73* 3.567 —6311 ~958
(1332) (129) (242) (1453)
p 1902 7160 9062* 2084
(232) (2 35) (3.15) (2 76)
DW. 1622 0750 009 1733
Ad~.R2 823 275 .043 847
*indicates statisticat significance at the 5 percent levet
to those using monthly data. Again, policy Ihe estimates including a six-month distrtb-
actions ha~ en oeffect direct or indirect on uted lag of total reserves, presented in table 3,
NMIME, their effect on ME come, only thi ough give a broadly similar picture. I lie coefficient j3
their ettect on Mi.’7 measuie the contemporaneous relation hip
“One difference i that the coefficient of the change in total will be substantially larger than 8 33. At high frequencies,
reserves in both the Ml and TCD equations is larger than however, the change in total reserves so adjusted is likely
8.33 and the difference is statistically significant. This to reflect the actual change in reserves so that the coeffi-
result is puzzling. It appears, however, that it is due to the cient is approximately equal to the reciprocal of the marginal
fact that the Board of Governors uses the average rather reserve requirement. At lower frequencies or in distributed
than the marginal reserve requirement when adjusting lag specifications that capture the long-run effect of a
reserves for changes in reserve requirements. The average change in constructed total reserve series, the estimated
reserve requirement is significantly smaller than the margi- coefficient better reflects the reserve requirement used in
nal. This means that the coefficient of a regression of the constructed series.
the change in TCD on a change in total reserves so adjusted
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and ATE; B measures the total effect of current
and past changes in total reserves on changes in
the dependent variable; and l~ measures the
sum of the lagged effects of ATE.” There is a
significant association between changes in
NMiME and changes in total reserves, as the
adjusted R-square is statistically different from
zero. The B-square is very small however, and
all of the statistical significance is associated
with the subsequent negative effect of total
reserves on NMIME.
The contemporaneous effect of a change in
total reserves on ME is larger in this specifica-
tion than in table 1; note, however, that this is
simply the sum of statistically significant and
statistically insignificant effects (the coefficient
for Mi, 7.976, plus the coefficient for NMiME,
E.73E). For both AM1 and ATCD, the results are
similar to those using quarterly data.”
For ME and NMIME, the subsequent effect of
policy actions largely offsets the initial effect.
That the subsequent effect is negative and
statistically significant is somewhat surprising.
If this result were robust and not merely the
artifact of the particular sample period, it would
create a potentially difficult problem for ME
control.” To see this, assume that ME is cur-
rently below its target level and the Fed
increases reserves to nudge ME upward. This
action would set in motion changes that would
eventually lead to a reduction in NM1ME, creat-
ing a need for additional policy action. Antici-
pating this, policymakers would have to be
more aggressive in increasing Ml to hit their
ME target.
The above analysis suggests that, if the Fed has
been targeting ME, there should be more instability
in the behavior of the policy instrument, and there
should be an inverse relationship between the
policy instrument and NMtME. Data from the
latter part of the 1980s is broadly consistent with
ME targeting. Figure 3 shows a 1E-month moving
average of the growth rate of total i-eserves and
Mi since January 19,59. Two things are evident
from the figure: the relationship between Mi and
total reserves improves dramatically following
the effective implementation of the MCA, and
the volatility of the growth rate of total reserves
increases pretty dramatically in the 1980s.
Figure 4 shows the IE-month moving averages
of total reserve growth and NM1ME growth for
the same period. The growth rates of total reserves
and NMiME are not negatively correlated as
strict ME targeting would suggest they should
be in the latter part of the 1980s. While there
are periods since the mid-1980s when sharp
accelerations in reserve growth are associated
with significant decelerations in the growth rate
of NMiME, a pattern of compensating variations
in the growth rates of these variables does not
emerge.” Hence, these data do not appear to
support the idea that the large, persistent
swings in total reserve growth are associated
directly with targeting ME.”
Nevertheless, as table 4 shows, reserve growth
was much faster on average since the mid-i9SOs,
and this faster reserve growth is associated
with a significant slowing in NMIME growth.
“Note that the estimated coefficients satisfy the restriction,
fi = U—p. The coefficients were estimated from a simple
reparameterizaton of the change in the appropriate
monetary aggregate on a constant term and the contem-
poraneous and six lags of the actual change in total
reserves.
“It could be argued that the results are sensitive to the
choice of the policy instrument. To investigate this possibili-
ty, two other policy instruments were considered, the ad-
justed monetary base and non-borrowed reserves. The
evidence of monetary policy actions on short-term interest
rates generally is strongest if non-borrowed reserves is
used as the policy instrument [see Thornton (1988) and
Christiano and Eichenbaum (forthcoming)l. Moreover, it is
generally argued that the Fed controls M2 through its in-
fluence on short-term interest rates and the connection be-
tween these rates and the demand for M2. Consequently,
non-borrowed reserves is a particularly important alternative
policy instrument to consider. The results, however, indi-
cate that the general conclusions drawn above are insensi-
tive to the variable chosen as the policy instrument.
200ne explanation for this result stems from the fact that the
first difference of NM1M2 has a statistically significant,
negative linear time trend during the period. It appears that
the negative lagged effect of the change in total reserves
on the change in NM1M2 in table 3 merely reflects the
negative trend in the latter variable over the sample period.
The trend coefficient is — .102 with a t-statistic of —4.59.
“For example, as M2 growth slipped to the bottom of the
Fed’s target range during the latter half of 1991, total
reserve growth accelerated sharply.
‘2The fact that the estimate of p in table 3 is negative,
however, could be evidence of this behavior. See footnote
11 for a discussion of this point.Table 4
Average Growth Rates of Various
Monetary and Reserve Aggregates
Aggregate 1959 1-1984.1 1984 2-1992.1
TA 353% 837%
NMIM2 1029 526
M2 8.57 S7 8
Consistent n ith the fed’s objective for ME
growth during the period, ME growth has
slowed signiticantly since the mid-1980s.”
Hence, while the ci idence suggests that the Fed
has not been cit empting to target ME closely
over periods of up to a year, it is consistent
with the Fed’s targeting of ME over a somewhat
longer time horizon. Indeed, the experience on
average over the latter half of the 1980s is
broadly consistent with the Fed’s paying
increased attention to ME and with the Fed’s
objectives for’ ME growth.
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The analytical and empirical analyses above
suggest that ME can be controlled only by
pursuing monetary policy actions to offset
movements in NMIME over which the Fed has
little or no control. While such actions are not
necessarily destablizing, they could be, espe-
cially when actions are required to offset large,
undesired movements in NM1ME. Moreover,
such large changes in policy actions could he
misinterpreted -
If the Fed wishes to target ME, changes in the
sti-ucture of reserve requirements could be
made that would significantly enhance its
controllability. Such changes would eliminate
the need for large swings in the policy actions
of the Fed.
The empirical results here and elsewhere
suggest that reserve requirements, like those
imposed on the checkable deposits in Mi, can
be an effective way to establish a dii-ect link
over the deposit components of the monetary
aggregates.” In other words, ME control could
be enhanced substantially by extending reserve
requirements to the financial assets that make
up NMIME.
Most effective monetary control would he
obtained if the percentage reserve requirement
were the same for all assets that make up the
aggregate. This would prevent shifts in the ag-
gregate that are simply due to shifts in the pub-
lic’s preference between deposits with “high”
marginal reserve r-equirements and those with
‘low” marginal reserve requirements. Control
would also be best if the tinting of reserve re-
quirements on all categoiies of deposits were
the same. As long as the timing is the same, this
issue is of little consequence, especially if the
objective is to control the monetary aggregate
over a period of a quarter oi- more.”
““r~Problem. 0/ the .ft.e..servc. ka~
Reserve requirements are often thought of as
a ‘reserve tax” because they force depository
institutions to hold a portion of their assets in
the form of non-interest-hearing deposits at the
Federal Reserve and because the marginal
interest income from these funds, which the
Fed invests in interest-hearing U.S. government
securities, is rebated to the U.S. Treasury.”
Imposing the current ieserve requirement on
transaction accounts to the non-transaction
components of ME would significantly increase
the reserve tax on depository institutions.” ‘rhis
would put them at a competitive disadvantage
and, undoubtedly, give rise to tax avoidance
schemes amid increased competition from other
“The Federal Open Market Committee’s target range for M2
decreased in a series of steps from 6 to 9 percent in 1984
to 2.5 to 6.5 percent by 1992.
“See Garfinkel and Thornton (1989, 1991a).
“See Thornton (1983) for a discussion of the timing issue as
it applied to LRA and CRA.
“Of course, depository institutions can also hold reserves in
the form of non-interest-bearing vault cash. Since many
institutions are currently holding vault cash in excess of
their required reserves, it may not be correct to suggest
that such holdings impose a tax on these institutions.
‘7The reserve tax is only part of the net tax on depository
institutions resulting from government supervision and
regulation, and it may not be large relative to the other tax-
es and subsidies. For example, currently over three-fourths
of the depository institutions satisfy their reserve require-
ments with vault cash, which they would probably hold in
the absence of reserve requirements. Second, depository
institutions are insured by the government at a fraction of
the cost. On net, institutions probably receive a net subsidy
from the government.financial intermediaries. The adverse effect of
extending reserve requirements to NMIME
could be offset, however, by paying interest on
required reserve balances held with Fedeial Re-
serve banks.”
Another problem would remain: requiring
depository institutions to hold a significant
portion of their assets as reserves might alter
significantly the composition of their assets
away from loans. This would further reduce
the role of depository institutions in supplying
credit to the economy.” Because of this, it
would seem desirable to set the percentage
reserve requirement on the components of ME
at a level that would leave the amount of total
reserves held at their current level. Unfor-
tunately, part of NMI ME—general purpose
broker and dealer money market mutual
funds—are not held at depository institutions.
Hence, either these deposits would have to be
exempt from reserve requirements or reserve
requirements would have to be extended to
non-depository institutions. The former option
seems the most desirable for at least two
reasons. First, extending reserve requirements
to non-depository institutions would set a prece-
dent and would raise other issues, such as
whether deposit insurance should be extended
to such institutions or whether they would be
permitted to borrow at the Federal Reserve’s
discount window. Second, because such deposits
account for only about 10 percent of ME, they
constitute a relatively minor source of leakage
for ME control.
Exempting money market mutual funds from
reserve requirements and imposing uniform
requirements on the remaining non-currency
components of ME would require an average
reserve requirement of about E percent.’°
Monetary control would be best if the marginal
and average reserve requirements were the
same, that is, if no deposits are exempt from
reserve requirements. Logic suggests and the
empirical evidence above supports the notion,
however, that this is not a major consideration
as long as changes in the quantity of deposits
that are exempt from reserve requirements are
infrequent and relatively small.
It has been increasingly the case that deposi-
tory institutions have relied on “managed
liabilities” to meet changes in loan demand.
During periods when loan demand is strong,
institutions are more aggressive in setting
higher rates on large and small time deposits
and money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) to
attract additional funds. Bank loan rates are
equal to the rate paid on these deposits plus a
spread that is determined by the competitive
conditions in the market. If such funds were
subjected to a E percent reserve tax, it would
raise the marginal cost of funds obtained from
managed liabilities by about E percent (11.98).
Whether this would harm the competitive posi-
tion of depository institutions further, given
that the total tax would be unchanged, is
unclear. In any event, depository institutions
have a competitive advantage because their
deposit liabilities are federally insured, while
their competitors’ are not.” Nevertheless, any
adverse effects of extending reserve require-
ments to most of NMIME could be mitigated by
paying interest on required reserve balances
with the Fed. The interest rate paid on these
balances could be tied to market rates and set
close enough to such rates to reduce the
reserve tax to the point at which it plays an
insignificant role in allocating credit.”
If these changes were made, the evidence sug-
gests that ME could be controlled without large
swings in the use of the Fed’s policy instrument.
Moieover, increased ME control could be achieved
without increasing the reserve tax and with little
or none of the other adverse effects commonly
associated with reserve requirements.
280f course, it would require an act of Congress for the
Federal Reserve to pay interest on reserves.
“See Kaufman (1991).
“The exact estimate of 1.76 percent is based on not-
seasonaIly-ad~usted data and total reserves not adiusted for
reserve requirement changes for April 1992.
“For example, it could be paid in arrears and at a rate that
is one-quarter of a percent below the rates depository
institutions paid on their managed liabilities in M2 over the
maintenance period. This would all but eliminate the reserve
tax. If this were done on the basis of the average rate paid
on such deposits, such a scheme would result in a slight
subsidy to institutions that pay below average rates and a
net effective cost to those paying above average rates. This
might have the effect of tempering slightly the incentive of
some institutions to bid aggressively for such funds.
3llt should be noted, however, that insurance premiums paid
by depository institutions have increased significantly.//~i~%4%k2
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Among other variahles, the Fed currently sets
target ranges for the ME monetary aggregate.
Without considering its desirability, this paper
analyzes the controllability of ME under existing
institutional arrangements. Both the analysis and
the data suggest that, currently, ME can be con-
trolled only through the Fed’s control of Ml -
The evidence also suggests that ME control is
difficult and that hitting an ME target may, at
times, require very large changes in open
market operations.
To counteract these problems, the paper
suggests several ways in which the Fed could
enhance ME controllability while virtually
eliminating the large changes in policy actions
that can be required under the current system
of reserve requirements. Enhanced ME control
could be achieved without increasing the reserve
tax on depository institutions and without forc-
ing depository institutions to shift their asset
portfolios away from loans.
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This appendix presents a simple model of ME
control. In the following analysis, the policy
instrument is taken to be the change in total
resem’ves, TR. ‘i’he gener’al results, however, do
not depend on the use of total reserves. Other
policy insti-uments such as the monetary base
or non-bor’rowed reserves would yield similar
results.
ME consists of Ml and some savings-type
deposits called the non-MI components of ME,
NMIME. That is,
(1) ME = Mi+NMIME.
Thus, changes in ME per unit of time can he
written as
(E) ME = M1-m-NMIME.
Mi consists of currency, C, and total check-
able deposits, TCD. Consequently, by definition
Ml can he written as
(3) Mi = (1 +k)TCD,where ki sthe ratio of currency to TCD. For
the purpose of this illustration, ki sassumed to
be constant.’
The quantity of TCD is directly related to the
Fed’s policy instrument through the Fed’s
system of reserve requirements. That is,
(4) TCD = (l/r)TR,
where r is the proportion of additional TOIl
that must be held in the form of reserves
(vault cash and deposit balances at the Federal
Reserve). Combining (3) and (4), yields
(5) Ml = ((1+k)/r)tR,
which establishes a direct link between Mi and
TR.
It may be that policy actions
indirectly, through their effect
bles, X. That is,
(6) Ml = h(X),
and
(7) X = j(TR).’
Together, they imply that
(8) Mi = f’ TR.’
Allowing for the possibility of both direct and
indirect effects of policy actions on Mi and the
possibility of an additive stochastic control
error, u, that is independent of both the direct
and indirect effects, the total effect of policy
actions on
Mi can be summarized as
(9) Ml = [(i+k)Ir) + f’]tR + u.
Since, by construction, policy actions have no
direct effect on NM1ME, the effect of such
actions on NM1ME can be expressed as
(10) NMIME = gTR+v,
where g’ is obtained in a manner analogous to
that used to obtain f’, and v denotes the stochastic
part of NM1ME that is unrelated to policy actions.
The control problem for ME can be illustrated
most easily by considering the general condition
that the effects of policy actions on NM1ME are
some proportion of their total effect on Mi.
That is,
(ii) g’ = A[(1+k)/r+YJ.
While there are no constraints on the value of
A, the fact that policy actions have no direct
effect on NM1ME makes it likely that Al <1.
Combining equations I and 9-il yields the
following equation for ME:
(1E) ME = [1 + A] [(i+k)Ir + f’]TR + u + v.
Several aspects of equation iE are worthy of note.
First, ME control is generally better the smaller
the control error and the stronger the indirect
effects of policy actions on NM1ME, that is, the
smaller are u and v.
Second, control will be better the larger the
proportion of Mi in ME. ‘rhis is not the case if
u >v, but that appears to be extremely unlikely.
This conjecture is supported by the empirical
analysis in the paper.
Third, control will be better the larger the in-
direct effect of policy actions on NMiME relative
to their total effect on Mi, that is, the larger the
value of A. This is so because the proportion of
ME related to TR is larger in proportion to u
and v the larger the value of A. Indeed, if A = 0
(which implies that g’ = 0), then the only direct
control over ME would come through the Fed’s
control over Mi. Control of ME could be obtained
only by offsetting shifts in y by manipulating Mi.
Since NMiME are large relative to Ml, this
could require relatively large changes in Mi. If
A were negative, ME control would require even
more aggressive Mi policies.
1This assumption is not critical to the major findings of the
analysis. See Garfinkel and Thornton (1991a) for a recent
criticism of this common assumption.
‘In the case of Ml, one could think of it as a situation in
which Ml was equal to the money multiplier (mm) times to-
tal reserves, where the multiplier is some function of X. That
is, Mi=mm(X)TR.
ship between these deposits and total reserves. Hence,
there is nothing equivalent to a money multiplier for
NMIM2.
‘The function f is equal to h(j(TR)) which implies that
TA = p(t), where t denotes time. These functions are written
in their general form, however, in the empirical section of
the paper, it will be assumed that they are linear.
also affect Mi
on other varia-
In this case, rii = mm(X)TR-t-[amm/DX)(3X/BTR)TR].
In the case of NM1M2, however, there is no direct relation-